Summary
Over the past decade, Lesotho’s political landscape has been marked by repeated leadership turnover and fragile coalition governments, which have steadily eroded public trust. Power oscillated between Pakalitha Mosisili—first as leader of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and later the Democratic Congress (DC)—and Tom Thabane of the All-Basotho Convention (ABC), itself an offshoot of the LCD. Thabane’s first term (2012–15) ended abruptly after his deputy, Mothejoa Metsing, who faced corruption allegations, was implicated in the 2014 political and security crisis that forced Thabane into exile. Subsequent internal fragmentation within the DC paved the way for Thabane’s return, only for […] The post Lesotho’s Anti-Corruption Paradox: Empowered but Undermined appeared first on African Arguments.
Full Text
GCIS / GovernmentZA / Flickr – CC BY-ND 2.0,https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/legalcode.en Over the past decade, Lesotho’s political landscape has been marked by repeated leadership turnover and fragile coalition governments, which have steadily eroded public trust. Power oscillated between Pakalitha Mosisili—first as leader of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and later the Democratic Congress (DC)—and Tom Thabane of the All-Basotho Convention (ABC), itself an offshoot of the LCD. Thabane’s first term (2012–15) ended abruptly after his deputy, Mothejoa Metsing, who faced corruption allegations, was implicated in the 2014 political and security crisis that forced Thabane into exile. Subsequent internal fragmentation within the DC paved the way for Thabane’s return, only for his second tenure to collapse amid serious criminal allegations, culminating in his resignation and replacement by Dr Moeketsi Majoro. These cycles of instability weakened institutional continuity while creating space for political renewal. Six months before the 2022 general election, businessman Sam Matekane launched the Revolution for Prosperity (RFP), campaigning on a technocratic platform that promised to tackle corruption and restore economic discipline. The RFP’s electoral victory reflected widespread voter frustration with established parties and a desire for credible reform . Upon assuming office, the new government moved quickly to implement visible economic interventions. Its first budget introduced extensive agricultural subsidies for fertiliser and seeds, covering between 50% and 80% of input costs. Framed as a response to food insecurity, the programme was welcomed by many smallholder farmers. However, opposition parties and civil society organisations raised concerns about implementation, alleging that politically connected farmers benefited disproportionately under the “block farming” model, while poorer farmers were marginalised. A subsequent investigation by the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO) alleged that inflated tender prices resulted in losses of approximately US$6.3 million during the procurement of agricultural inputs. At the same time, government expenditure on large infrastructure projects increased substantially, including major roadworks and the expansion of Moshoeshoe I International Airport. In the latter case, the project’s cost reportedly escalated from US$3 to US$11 million, prompting parliamentary scrutiny and allegations of conflicts of interest involving the Ministry of Public Works. Concerns were also raised about procurement processes in the road sector and other projects, including Habelo electricity substation . These developments underscored the tension between an assertive developmental agenda and persistent governance risks. Against this backdrop, the DCEO emerged as a central institution in the government’s anti-corruption narrative. In recent years, the agency has received unprecedented financial support, with its budget increasing to US$4.2 million in the 2024/25 fiscal year—more than triple its historical allocation . This expansion enabled the DCEO to pursue high-profile investigations, including scrutiny of ministerial asset declarations, procurement processes in key ministries, and asset recovery efforts . On the surface, these developments suggested renewed political commitment to tackling corruption. Yet, increased activity has not translated into sustained public confidence. While investigations have multiplied, prosecutions—particularly involving politically influential figures—have remained limited. This gap between investigative visibility and judicial outcomes has fuelled scepticism about whether the DCEO’s enhanced capacity reflects genuine institutional reform or a carefully managed response to domestic and international pressure. Reform or regression? Concerns about the DCEO’s independence intensified following a series of leadership changes. In 2023, the appointment of Advocate Knorx Molelle as Director-General attracted criticism from the Law Society of Lesotho, which questioned his eligibility and the transparency of the appointment process. Molelle’s abrupt resignation in early 2025, reportedly following a meeting with the Prime Minister, was never fully explained. Advocate Brigadier Mantšo Sello, a senior officer from the Lesotho Defence Force, subsequently replaced him . Although the government indicated that Sello would resign from the military, civil society organisations expressed concern about appointing a military figure to head a civilian anti-corruption agency, particularly in a context where institutional autonomy remains fragile. Internal instability further compounded these challenges. In April 2025, Principal Investigations Officer Tsotang Likotsi challenged his suspension before the High Court, alleging procedural irregularities, non-disclosure of evidence, and an unlawfully constituted disciplinary committee . Likotsi argued that the disciplinary action reflected factional struggles within the organisation rather than genuine misconduct. While these claims remain subject to judicial determination, they have contributed to perceptions of internal dysfunction within an institution tasked with enforcing integrity across the public sector. A structural problem The difficulties confronting the DCEO are not unique. They reflect broader structural weaknesses common to many developing democracies, where oversight institutions operate within legal frameworks that provide limited protection against executive interference. A 2025 assessment by the United Nations Human Rights Committee noted that the DCEO continues to lack independent prosecutorial authority and remains exposed to political pressure. The report also highlighted the failure to implement the long-proposed 2019 anti-corruption bill, intended to strengthen institutional autonomy. Similar observations appear in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which consistently points to executive branch dominance and the vulnerability of accountability institutions in Lesotho. Despite constitutional guarantees, oversight bodies and even the judiciary face persistent challenges in asserting independence in politically sensitive cases. These weaknesses are reflected in international perception measures, including the BTI 2024 , where Lesotho scored an average of 5.3 out of 10 points on rule of law indicators, and 4.5 on stability of democratic institutions. Cracks in the criminal justice system The paradox extends beyond the DCEO to the broader criminal justice system. In June 2025, the government suspended the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Advocate Hlalefang Motinyane, a decision strongly criticised by the Law Society of Lesotho as unconstitutional. Despite these objections, the suspension was enforced . An acting DPP was subsequently appointed, with resistance persisting even after a court ordered Motinyane’s reinstatement. Motinyane has since claimed that her suspension was politically motivated, alleging that she was pressured to withdraw charges against individuals linked to the governing coalition. While these allegations have yet to be adjudicated, they raise concerns about executive overreach and the politicisation of prosecution. Conclusion Lesotho’s anti-corruption landscape is marked by contradiction. Institutions such as the DCEO appear to be empowered by increased funding, expanded mandates, and heightened public visibility. Yet their effectiveness remains constrained by leadership instability, legal weaknesses, and persistent political interference. Rather than signalling transformative reform, these dynamics risk entrenching a model of performative accountability—one that creates the appearance of action while leaving underlying power structures intact. The government’s actions toward the DPP and other key institutions further expose this tension. Without effective enforcement, respect for court judgments, and credible legal reforms that insulate oversight bodies from political interference, Lesotho risks further weakening institutions meant to safeguard the rule of law. Regrettably, greater emphasis appears to be placed on legal reform, while effective law enforcement—equally indispensable—is neglected. The post Lesotho’s Anti-Corruption Paradox: Empowered but Undermined appeared first on African Arguments .