Summary
Human rights abuses marred the presidential elections in Uganda in January 2026 and the contested polls in Tanzania in October 2025. As neighbouring Kenya enters a pre-electoral phase with presidential elections expected in 18 months, political violence is already underway. The government has carried out detentions, arrests, and intimidation of activists and political opponents in response to waves of mass protests since 2023. This repression is shaping the political environment ahead of the 2027 elections, exacerbated by increasing transnational repression of critics and political opponents between the three countries. The question arises: has repression become normalized around elections in East […] The post Have Election Crackdowns Become the Norm? Domestic and Cross-Border Repression in East Africa appeared first on African Arguments.
Full Text
“Fair elections, be vigilant, it’s your vote, it’s your country.” Photo: Devon Knudsen Human rights abuses marred the presidential elections in Uganda in January 2026 and the contested polls in Tanzania in October 2025. As neighbouring Kenya enters a pre-electoral phase with presidential elections expected in 18 months, political violence is already underway. The government has carried out detentions, arrests, and intimidation of activists and political opponents in response to waves of mass protests since 2023. This repression is shaping the political environment ahead of the 2027 elections, exacerbated by increasing transnational repression of critics and political opponents between the three countries. The question arises: has repression become normalized around elections in East Africa and what can be done to prevent it? Civil society leaders across the region are innovating new approaches to demanding electoral integrity and protecting civic space. International actors have tools with a proven track record of successfully mitigating election violence. If Kenyan, regional, and international actors take coordinated action now, there ’ s still time to lower the risk of election violence. A regional race to the bottom While Tanzanian political analysts had warned of the risk of human rights abuses by security forces in the 2025 national elections, few anticipated the scale of abuses that ensued. Although instances of political violence occurred in the months leading up to election day, the level of violence spiked after Tanzanian security forces responded to protests over election manipulation with lethal force. Amnesty International verified 26 videos and 10 photos , one of which showed 70 bodies piled up on the floors of a morgue of a hospital in the country ’ s capital. Media and civil society reported that Tanzanian security killed hundreds of protesters and bystanders, while officials of the main opposition party, Chadema, told Human Rights Watch they had collected reports of up to 1,000 people killed by police and unidentified security forces. Network data showed signs of a deliberate internet shutdown during the violence. Tanzania experienced lower levels of violence in past elections, but by failing to hold perpetrators accountable, it increased its risk of renewed violence . In the 2020 elections, Human Rights Watch documented that security forces killed at least 14 people and injured another 55 on the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar alone. Human rights abuses continued to occur in between elections, with the Tanganyika Law Society writing in 2024 that they received reports of at least 83 people going missing since President Samia Suluhu Hassan assumed office in 2021 . Additional reports of killings , intimidation , and mass arrests preceded the 2024 local elections reiterating warning signs of potential violence in national elections, when the political stakes would be higher. Despite these warnings, United States foreign assistance for election-related programming in Tanzania was paused nine months before the election and later terminated . Although the scale of violence following Uganda ’ s national election in January was smaller than Tanzania ’ s, there are parallels in the lead up to elections in both countries. United Nations experts reported at least 160 cases of enforced disappearances in 2025 and 550 opposition members had been arrested ahead of Ugandan elections. In the days leading up to the vote , Ugandan authorities suspended at least 10 human rights organization s and blocked internet access . Ugandan election violence is not new. Uganda’s 2021 elections were marred by violence and abuses , including killings by security forces, arrests and beatings of opposition supporters and journalists, disruption of opposition rallies, and another internet shutdown . One of the main opposition leaders alleged that hundreds of people had been detained or abducted. Uganda ’ s 2016 election saw many of the same patterns of abuses . Cross-border collaboration Political repression by the security forces in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya against their citizens has been compounded by cross-border collaboration in targeting opponents and critics. Kizza Besigye, a veteran Uganda opposition politician, was abducted from Kenya in November 2024 and arraigned in a Ugandan military court. Four months earlier, Kenyan and Ugandan security officials abducted 36 supporters of Besigye ’ s former political party , the Forum for Democratic Change, in Kenya and transferred them to the Ugandan capital, where they were charged with terrorism. In January 2025, a Tanzanian activist, Maria Sarungi Tsehai, was abducted in Nairobi by three men believed to be Tanzanian security officers. In October, Ugandan authorities abducted two Kenyan activists, Bob Njagi and Nicholas Oyoo, and detained them incommunicado for 38 days . Upon their release and return to Kenya , President Yoweri Museveni accused them of being “ experts in riots .” Regional authorities have also attempted to thwart expressions of solidarity among civil society leaders and Gen Z youth movements across the three East African countries. Following Besigye’s arrest, Martha Karua, a Kenyan High Court advocate, led a team of 50 lawyers to defend him. The military court rejected the team’s appearance, alleging a lack of written instructions from the defendants. When Tundu Lissu, the leader of Tanzania’s main opposition party, was charged with treason and denied bail, Ugandan and Kenyan activists, including Agather Atuhaire and Boniface Mwangi, travelled to observe Lissu’s trial. Tanzanian security forces abducted Atuhaire and Mwangi and tortured them before leaving them at the borders of their respective countries. Other political and human rights activists with them, including Kenya’s former Chief Justice Willy Mutunga and Advocate Karua, were turned away at the airport . Kenyan politicians have also threatened their own citizens supporting opposition candidates elsewhere in East Africa. In May 2025, Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi said activists who recently travelled to Tanzania would have themselves to blame if they exported “ bad manners “ to neighbouring countries . Two days later, President Ruto apologized to Tanzania and Uganda for “ cyberbullying ” by Kenyans online. In a televised address in November 2025 , a senator of the ruling United Democratic Alliance (UDA) urged President Hassan and Ugandan President Museveni to arrest the “ busybody activists “. Implications for Kenya Kenya is approaching two decades since the disputed 2007–08 presidential election, during which at least 1,100 people were killed, including more than 400 by the police. The country’s response to those abuses included the passage of the 2010 constitution , which established key accountability institutions, such as the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, the Internal Affairs Unit of the police, and the National Police Service Commission . In the interim, however, Kenyan authorities have severely weakened these mechanisms. Although Kenyan political leaders agreed to promote accountability for election violence to prevent its recurrence, Kenyan authorities failed to prosecute state and non-state actors implicated in the 2007–08 post-election violence. That pattern of abuses has persisted during and after elections . During Kenya’s contested 2017 elections, police and armed gangs killed more than 100 people , mostly in Nairobi and western Kenya. The authorities have been slow to prosecute those responsible. The trial of police officers charged with beating a six-month-old infant to death during house raids is the only case to reach the courts to date . Hundreds of protesters were injured but many chose not to forego medical attention out of fear they would be arrested in hospitals. Although Kenya’s 2022 elections were largely peaceful at the time, recurring demonstrations started months later, citing “ electoral malpractice “ as one of the grievances. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, a non-profit organization that collects data on political violence, reported excessive use of force by police, with at least 35 deaths during protests. The unrest stopped after President William Ruto and the late Raila Odinga signed a pact that included a plan to enhance the credibility of elections and ensure accountability for police violence. The pact remains largely unimplemented , raising fears over future electoral disputes. The 2027 elections are over a year away, but repression and attacks on activists have been underway for several years. More recent examples of attacks on activists and civil society, independent media , the judiciary , and key opposition figures who have expressed interest in running for president have created a climate of fear ahead of the 2027 elections. Will Kenya follow in the steps of its neighbours? The indicators are not encouraging. Just as the violence in Tanzania’s 2024 local elections forewarned the violence in national elections a year later, Kenyan analysts see recent by-elections as a portent of things to come . Local elections were characterized by police abuses and informal youth militias were paid to commit violence across multiple constituencies . In Malava, for example, a coalition of five NGOs said that police provided security for the so-called “goons,” and appeared to support the state-backed candidate. Recent incidents of harassment against possible opposition candidates are also worrying. In the aftermath of the by-elections in November, the state withdrew security from George Natembeya, the Trans Nzoia county governor who supported an opposition candidate and has expressed interest in running for president in 2027. Police and pro-government youth groups have disrupted several public meetings of Ruto’s former deputy and vocal critic, Rigathi Gachagua. Mwangi has reportedly received death threats over an extended period , which intensified after he announced his candidacy for president. Despite Ruto’s campaign promise to end extra-judicial killings , new waves of killings and enforced disappearances by police units occurred during his administration. During the 2024 Gen Z protests, security forces from the Directorate of C riminal Investigations and National Intelligence Service assaulted, arbitrarily detained, tortured, abducted , disappeared, and killed scores of protesters. Similar activities against protestors have been documented in 2025. What can i nternational actors d o? During the 2007–08 election dispute, the African Union, United Nations, European Union, and the United States responded robustly by freezing assistance to security forces and enhancing support for election monitoring and civil society safety mechanisms. They also invested in addressing the underlying drivers of violence and establishing early warning systems to help prevent recurrence. Such resolute responses to election violence have yet to be replicated in Uganda and Tanzania. The mechanisms that USAID and the U.S. Department of State had in place to prevent election violence in both countries were cut short due to foreign assistance terminations and the dismantling of USAID and human rights-focused bureaus across the Department of State . Nevertheless, diplomats did take some action in response to abuses by state security forces during the 2025 post-election protests in Tanzania. Notably, the European Union and the United States urged Samia Suluhu Hassan to establish an inclusive, independent commission of inquiry, demanding transparency, accountability, and political reforms. However, many analysts say that without stronger measures from the international community, pressure on Suluhu Hassan will fall short of producing meaningful reform. Stronger action is also needed from regional actors. Although the African Union and East Africa Community were a driving force behind the negotiations that reached an agreement resolving Kenya ’ s 2007–08 post-election crisis, they too fell short in insulating electoral and accountability institutions from executive branch interference. Taking this additional step would have established a positive example, not just for subsequent elections in Kenya, but also Uganda, Tanzania, and other countries in the region. Looking forward, several European donor governments are supporting Kenyan civil society organizations advocating for transparent and credible election processes, and at least one multilateral donor is hoping to join them, but more international and regional support is urgently needed. While the international community ’ s strong ties to the Kenyan government obligates them to act, the primary responsibility of preventing election violence clearly falls to Kenyan authorities. The Kenyan government must respect the independence of electoral institutions, government oversight bodies, and the judiciary, while answering citizens’ calls for campaign finance reform and restoring faith in election processes. The government should refrain from directing the police to intimidate protestors and opposition supporters and prevent interference in the investigation and prosecution of political violence. They must also respect civic space and media freedom and facilitate an environment where journalists and human rights activists can do their work without harassment ahead of the 2027 elections. Kenya is at a crossroads—it must not follow the well-beaten paths of its neighbours or regress to its own violent past. The post Have Election Crackdowns Become the Norm? Domestic and Cross-Border Repression in East Africa appeared first on African Arguments .